New Mandala just published an op-ed I wrote about Burma's nascent economic reforms. In it, I try to frame Burma's elite politics in light of what we know about political institutions. I've always been a bit skeptical of the argument that Burma's reforms are solely a response to foreign pressure and this article was intended to highlight the domestic incentives for reform.
One important aspect of my analysis is that I do not assume anything about the preferences of any of Burma's political elites, particularly whether they want democracy or not. After all, I don't know them personally (well, except for Aung San Suu Kyi). However, I do assume that politicians do seek higher political office, which I think can either support a cynical or idealistic interoperation of events. Either way, I argue that there are enough political incentives to sustain the reforms, at least so long as they don't directly impinge upon the military.
Critics agree that much of Southeast Asia desperately needs judicial reform and rule of law. Yet, there is remarkably little comparative scholarship on law and legal institutions in the region. In this blog, I'll follow constitutional developments in Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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