First, a few general observations about the book:
Administrative Law and Governance in Asia represents a serious effort by top experts in the field. Tom Ginsburg of University of Chicago is well-known for his scholarship on judicial review in Asia, particularly his excellent Judicial Review in New Democracies. Randall Peerenboom has famously cautioned against imposing Western legal norms upon the Chinese legal system. John Gillespie's scholarship focuses mostly on commercial law in Vietnam and is (at least in my opinion) one of the top three Western scholars studying Vietnamese law. Stewart Fenwick, associated with Tim Lindsey's Asia Law Group, has worked on judicial reform in Indonesia for several years. For this reason alone, the book is worth reading to become familiar with the scholars and their work.
Compilations of this sort are in danger of simply reprinting the laws and judicial decisions from individual countries, rather than providing context and analysis. I remember one book about competition policy in Asia that essentially reprinted each country's anti-monopoly law. Needless to say, in an age when I can find the important legislation from ASEAN countries online, that type of book is useless. Fortunately, Administrative Law and Governance in Asia by and large avoids this trap. The authors analyze on judicial institutions, not just the text of laws. They really provide a sense of the success of judicial review in the country as practiced. Several of the articles provide amazing data on courts in Southeast Asia that I haven't found elsewhere, from appeal rates to caseloads. Of course, not all of the articles rise to this level of excellence, but most do.
Now, for the bad. As a Burma specialist, I am always disappointed that the Routledge series does not include a chapter on Burma. Granted, the series also omits Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, and East Timor, but Burma generates significantly more interest (as can be gleaned from the excitement over Obama's new Burma policy). I suspect the editors either could not find anybody qualified to write such a chapter, or decided that Burma's legal system had not yet developed sufficiently to make it worthy of inclusion. On the first point, all I can say is that hopefully in 10 years or so I can fill that gap and write those chapters. On the second point, it is true that Burma has not had any mechanism for judicial review since the 1962 coup. However, that certainly doesn't mean Burma doesn't have administrative law. In fact, I think Burma could serve as a useful counterpoint as the prototype patrimonial legal system. Also, there are some interesting provisions in the new constitution regarding judicial review, such as the constitutional tribunal. I will keep my fingers crossed for future volumes. [As a non-ASEAN side note, I also hope Routledge finds a way to include Mongolia, which has a dynamic constitutional court. I know several of the authors in this volume have experience with Mongolian courts].
A more serious concern I had with the book was its bifurcated nature and failure to focus on administrative law. "Judicial review" can encompass many ideas, but lawyers most often consider the power of courts to determine the government's compliance with 1) the constitution, or 2) superior statutes and regulations. While the basic institutional concept of judicial review is the same for both practices, they involve very different fields of substantive law. Constitutional review often involves human rights, elections, presidential power - the "hot" topics in law. On the other hand, administrative review deals with more technical fields, such as regulation of public utilities - the classes most law students dreaded.
Unfortunately, this split arises throughout the book and is never fully integrated into one idea. Some of the chapters seem almost like two separate articles, with one half addressing administrative courts and the other constitutional courts. Some authors even wrote each half in a different style or using a different frame of analysis. Sometimes, the switch is jarring, For example, Gan Ching Chuan's article on Malaysia begins by comparing the Court of Appeal's willingness to protect fundamental rights with the Indian Supreme Court, but ends with a discussion of Malaysian public utilities. I found both halves interesting, but would prefer the first half expanded in a book dedicated exclusively to constitutional review in Asia.
There is a question of how different these concepts of administrative and constitutional review really are. After all, both address the power of judiciary to hold the state apparatus accountable to the law. However, there is an important difference: political elites in have viewed administrative review as less threatening than constitutional review. Several authoritarian countries in the region, from Communist China to Suharto's Indonesia, created administrative courts with limited powers of judicial review. Both regimes used administrative law to handle the increased complexities of modern economies, as well as to rationalize the law. However, both governments resisted (and China's still resists) any sort of constitutional review. Indonesia's Administrative Courts during the 1990s were able to make bold decisions in part because elites viewed them as peripheral, but the country only established the Mahkamah Konstitusi during the reformasi era. In short, because elites in the legal systems treat these concepts separately, I think it would have been useful to separate these two fields a bit more clearly throughout the book.
Now, since this is a blog about Southeast Asia, here are short reviews of the chapters dealing with Southeast Asian (and Chinese) judicial review:
1) More law, less courts: Legalized governance, judicialization, and dejudicialization in China - Randall Peerenboom
Peerenboom's scholarship has emphasized that we should not expect the rule of law in China (or elsewhere in Asia) to resemble Western conceptions of the rule of law. Because of its political and cultural context, China has focused on administrative remedies to handle citizen complaints. He also details the "dejudicialization" over the past few years, noting that courts, which are expensive and do not have autonomous enforcement powers, may not be the most relevant forum for most Chinese citizens. The Chinese government has opened some mechanisms for administrative accountability (notably the Xinfang system), but has in recent years rolled back any attempts at judicial review. In a sense, these developments provide an interesting contrast to the rest of the countries covered in the book.
2) The juridification of administartive complaints and review in Vietnam - John Gillespie
Of all the essays in the book, Gillespie's chapter on Vietnam does the best job of staying focused on administrative law. He explores various theories to explain why Vietnam has moved ever-so-slowly toward judicialization of administrative complaints. However, more interesting are the "non-legal" administrative mechanisms. Local firms and elites prefer these alternatives since, as domestic actors who understand the system, they have an advantage over foreign competition. However, this comes at the cost of weaker courts. Domestic actors appear more hesitant to use courts and potentially damage their relationships with local officials. Furthermore, as might be expected in a Communist legal system, judges have been unwilling to challenge the state. The Supreme Court even ordered judges to avoid "interfering with the mechanisms of government." After reading this chapter, I became anxious to read Mark Sidel's new book on Vietnam's constitution.
3) The emergence of administrative justice in Thailand after the 1997 Constitution - Peter Leyland
This chapter had the distinct misfortunate of going to press right after the 2006 coup, which ousted Prime Minister Thaksin. As such, its greatest value is historical. Having said that, this is an especially useful chapter for American lawyers to read because it shows the influence of European legal theory on Thai law. Leyland also discusses the principles of administrative review, such as abuse of discretion - although proportionality was not among them.
He ends the chapter with two brief case studies. These I found less useful. On the one hand, Leyland states that political elites have allowed the Administrative Court to act independently because they view it as having less of a role in controversial matters, yet both case studies involved the media and Egat, assets dear to Thaksin during his rule. Furthermore, as was apparent last year, the Constitutional Court has been independent enough to topple the Thai cabinet. The Thai judiciary as a whole, not just the Administrative Courts, has a reputation for professionalism and honesty unmatched anywhere else in Southeast Asia (except Singapore). Leyland only hints at the deeper roots of the judiciary's strength near the very end of his article when he notes that the judicial appointment process focuses on merit and that the court's finances is ring-fenced. I wish he had developed those points a bit further.
Of course, since publication, the Thai military enacted a new constitution and the Constitutional Court has changed significantly. Check out Tom Ginsburg's recent article about Thai courts for an update.
4) Administrative law and judicialized governance in Malaysia: the Indian connection - Gan Ching Chuan
As I mentioned above, this article definitely felt bifurcated. I found the first half an interesting overview of developments in constitutional review among the Courts of Appeal. Chuan describes a moderately liberalizing trend during the late 1990s up until 2007, when the Federal Court imposed more a restrictive interpretation on fundamental rights and access to courts. Unfortunately, he never teases that tension out to explain why the Federal Court butted heads with the Court of Appeals. Was there political pressure from above? Did the composition of the court change during the mid-2000s? I would like to have seen the article continue along these lines rather than venture off into public utility law for the second half.
I have been encouraging Southeast Asian lawyers to look at constitutional law elsewhere for ideas and inspiration. However, I also felt Chuan's comparison to India might not be the most appropriate. India's Supreme Court has become a very aggressive veto player and vocal in its advocacy on behalf of public interest causes. As I've argued elsewhere for Pakistan, this may not be the best model to follow. Unlike India's vibrant democracy, elites still have an outsized influence over Malaysian politics. Even though Malaysian courts will occasionally borrow Indian case law, as recent judicial scandals indicate Malaysia's courts are, at best, compromised. Malaysia's courts must also deal with the increasing influence of Islamic law and a society deeply divided among ethnic lines - problems India has, but to a far more limited extent. Furthermore, India's Supreme Court is actually on the global extreme in terms of theories of constitutional interpretation. Most Western courts would reject India's views on substantive equality for example. Thus, I do not believe Malaysian constitutional lawyers should set an outlier like India as its goal.
5) "Government by judiciary" in the Philippines: ideological and doctrinal framework - Raul C. Pangalangan
Pangalangan's article isn't focused on administrative law at all, but rather is an exposition of constitutional review in Philippines. At times he loses a scholarly objectivity and shows his sympathies toward judicial activism. Nonetheless, the article makes two important points that anybody interested in the Philippines should (and often doesn't) realize.
First, the 1987 Constitution reflects the protectionist and pro-poor policy ideology of the 1986 People Power movement. It includes downright socialist provisions on national ownership of strategic economic sectors that the Arroyo administration tried, but failed, to amend. Unfortunately for the country, the drafters succeeded in freezing the constitution in place, which has hampered its competitiveness in the international economy.
Second, the Philippine Supreme Court has become a vocal and progressive veto player in the government. The court demonstrated this late last year when it struck down the Mindanao peace settlement. However, as Pangalangan argues, it has also acted as a champion of the 1987 Constitution's progressive ideals. The court has liberalized standing requirements for public interest litigants and eschewed legal formalism. Unlike most Southeast Asia Supreme Courts, it is often involved in the most controversial issues of the day.
Having spent some time in the Philippines working on public interest law, I part ways with Pangalangan in assessing the court's success The Philippine Supreme Court is a lone progressive voice in a sea of conservative elites. It succeeds in striking down laws when, as with the Mindanao settlement, a significant segment of the elite has something to gain. When the Supreme Court goes against elite interests, as with environmental and human rights cases, the court appears impotent. Despite Chief Justice Reynato Puno's valiant efforts, the judiciary still has not convicted any officials for the spate of extrajudicial killings. I also have gotten the sense that the Supreme Court's progressive rulings on environmental law have not filtered down to the lower courts, which still require traditional legal standing. Thus, the Supreme Court is only partially successful as the guardian of the Constitution. I suspect Pangalangan would agree with this assessment, but I wish he had spent more time discussing the limits of judicialization as well as the court's doctrine.
6) Administrative law and judicial review in Indonesia: the search for accountability - Stewart Fenwick
This is easily one of the best articles in the entire volume. I thought I had read everything about Indonesia's courts in the English language, but was obviously wrong. It is packed with information and data that are unavailable anywhere else. I suspect Fenwick obtained much of the data during his years as a consultant with Tim Lindsey's Asia Law Group.
One statistic that struck me - 98% of cases in the court system deal with criminal matters, and of those over 90% concern minor traffic accidents. In other words, civil litigation is almost non-existent! This has very important consequences for ongoing judicial reform projects in the country. Often reformers have focused on reducing the backlog, but there is also a need to reduce the number of appeals to the Supreme Court. If so many cases really deal with such petty issues, the courts should establish a certiorari system to make appeals discretionary, not by right.
[Note: there is a chapter about Singapore's courts in this book, but I haven't gotten around to reading it. Sorry, Singapore!]
I also highly recommend Ginsburg's Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases.